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ABSTRACT
Recent attacks have broken process isolation by exploiting
microarchitectural side channels that allow indirect access to
shared microarchitectural state. Enclaves strengthen the pro-
cess abstraction to restore isolation guarantees.
We propose MI6, an aggressively speculative out-of-order
processor capable of providing secure enclaves under a threat
model that includes an untrusted OS and an attacker capable of
mounting any software attack currently considered practical,
including those utilizing control flow mis-speculation. MI6
is inspired by Sanctum [16] and extends its isolation guaran-
tee to more realistic memory hierarchy. It also introduces a
purge instruction, which is used only when a secure process
is (de)scheduled, and implements it for a complex processor
microarchitecture. We model the performance impact of en-
claves in MI6 through FPGA emulation on AWS F1 FPGAs
by running SPEC CINT2006 benchmarks as enclaves within
an untrusted Linux OS. Security comes at the cost of approxi-
mately 16.4% average slowdown for protected programs.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Secure Enclaves
The process abstraction is pervasive and underpins modern
software systems. Conventional wisdom pertaining to process
security teaches that an attacker that cannot name a particular
state element cannot attack that element. Even in a situation
where unconditional trust in the OS is considered tenable, the
architectural process isolation an OS can enforce with commod-
ity hardware falls short: microarchitectural side channels allow
indirect access to shared microarchitectural state from which
information about a process can be leaked (e.g., [8], [65]).
Recent attacks based on control flow speculation (e.g., Spec-
tre [33]) have brought this issue to the fore.
Our focus in this paper is to strengthen the capability of
conventional systems, i.e., speculative out-of-order (OOO)
multicores running an OS (e.g., Linux), with processes with
strong isolation guarantees. We will call such processes en-
claves, borrowing the term from Intel SGX [45], though the
idea predates SGX. Enclaves are to be used to run secure tasks,
and will coexist with ordinary processes.
∗Student authors listed in alphabetical order.
Strong isolation requires a stronger guarantee than private
memory. The goal of the enclave abstraction is to achieve the
following property:
PROPERTY 1 (STRONG ISOLATION). Any attack by a priv-
ileged attacker program co-located on a machine with the vic-
tim enclave that can extract a secret inside the victim, can also
be mounted successfully by an attacker on a different machine
than the victim.
The attacker on a different machine than the victim is only
able to communicate with the victim through the victim’s pub-
lic API and can observe the latency of these API calls. No
other program should be able to infer anything private from
the enclave program through its use of shared resources or
shared microarchitectural state, e.g., cache or branch predictor
state. This implies that it is not enough to just give a unique
set of addresses to an enclave, but separation of resources has
to be provided at all levels of the cache hierarchy where these
addresses may reside. Our goal is to make sure that an enclave
cannot leak information to or be influenced by any program
running in the system. To achieve this, all shared resources in
our microarchitecture are isolated spatially and temporally as
required by our threat model, described in Section 2.3.
Enclaves trade expressivity for security; enclave software is
restricted in how it interacts with untrusted software, including
the OS (cf. Section 2.1). A trusted security monitor running
in machine mode mediates enclave entry and exit, and verifies
resource allocation decided by untrusted system software to
ensure, for example, allocation of non-overlapping memory
to different enclaves. The security monitor (cf. Section 6.2)
is designed to protect itself from tampering (by appropriately
configuring hardware protection mechanisms), even if the OS
has been compromised.
We trust our hardware and assume that it is bug free. Our
threat model assumes a privileged software adversary and is
detailed in Section 2.3; we also describe what is outside our
threat model in Section 2.4. We are primarily concerned with
attacks that exploit shared hardware resources to interact with
the victim enclave via methods outside its public API.
MI6 is based on the open-source out-of-order RiscyOO [67]
processor, and provides secure enclaves under our threat model.
We model the performance impact of enclaves in MI6 through
FPGA emulation on AWS F1 FPGAs by running benchmarks
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from SPEC CINT2006 on top of an untrusted Linux OS.
1.2 Contributions and organization
Like Sanctum [16], we argue that enclaves defined as a
strengthened process are an excellent abstraction for secure
computation. We make the following contributions in support
of our argument:
1. We show that there are many subtle side channels asso-
ciated with queues and associated arbitration required
to handle multiple outstanding memory requests in the
memory hierarchy, and describe how to enforce strong
isolation in such systems (cf. Section 5.4). MI6 therefore
protects against a broader class of attacks than Sanctum,
which excludes, for example, attacks that use the cache
coherence bandwidth and DRAM controller bandwidth
channels from its threat model.
2. We show that the complexity of the out-of-order pro-
cessor core can be completely decoupled from the com-
plexity of a modern memory hierarchy by using a new
purge instruction, which can be easily incorporated in
any Instruction Set Architecture (ISA). We describe op-
timizations based on indistinguishability to software in
our purge implementation (cf. Section 6.1).
3. We describe key modifications to the security monitor
to maintain strong isolation in a speculative processor
(cf. Section 6.2), and an optimization relating to access
permissions checking (cf. Section 5.3).
4. We provide a detailed evaluation of the performance
overhead of enclaves in an implementation of the MI6
OOO processor. We show, for example, the cost of flush-
ing shared microarchitectural state on each system call,
which is required for strong isolation. Overall, security
comes at the cost of approximately 16.4% average slow-
down for protected programs. We note that this number
assumes a baseline that is not protected against physical
attacks on memory unlike Aegis [53] and Intel SGX [45],
and with a constant latency DRAM controller.
Organization: In Section 2, we describe the enclave abstrac-
tion and threat model. Related work is the subject of Section
3. In Section 4 we describe the baseline implementation of
the RiscyOO speculative out-of-order processor based on the
RISC-V ISA [58] and list the hardware modifications we made.
Section 5 describes how we provide steady state isolation of
enclaves in MI6. Section 6 describes how MI6 handles transi-
tions between enclaves. The performance of MI6 is evaluated
in Section 7. We conclude in Section 8.
2. ENCLAVES AND ISOLATED EXECUTION
In this section, we describe the enclave abstraction as pre-
sented in [52] (cf. Section 2.1). We describe the high-level
approach to (micro)architectural isolation MI6 employs to
achieve Property 1 (cf. Section 2.2). We then describe the
capabilities of the adversary (cf. Section 2.3). We also discuss
what falls outside our threat model (cf. Section 2.4).
2.1 The Enclave Abstraction
A processor that can serve as an enclave platform imple-
ments isolated software environments in disjoint address spaces
only accessible from within a given enclave’s threads of execu-
tion. An enclaved process resides entirely and exclusively in
such isolated memory, which contains all code and data struc-
tures comprising the enclave, and is isolated from all other
software in the system.
An enclave platform must guarantee integrity and private
execution of an enclave in the presence of other software, as
per its threat model, and thus strongly isolates the enclave from
all other software. As a consequence of its isolation, an enclave
cannot transparently receive system services or issue system
calls, as software outside the enclave is not trusted with access
to enclave private memory. The enclave platform mediates
control transfer to and from an enclave via statically-defined
locations called entry points, and guarantees no side effects of
execution remain across these context switches.
Enclaves requiring system services must proxy through un-
trusted software, and must respect that the OS services are
untrusted. With these guarantees, enclaves can become the
only trusted components of an application (aside from the plat-
form itself), and a carefully programmed enclave can execute
safely even when privileged software is compromised.
The platform also implements the measurement and attes-
tation protocol of [36] to prove enclave integrity to a remote
party.
2.2 Enclave Isolation
The goal of the enclave abstraction is to achieve Property 1.
To protect enclave integrity, the processor implements archi-
tectural isolation (that of memory) by setting up invariants in a
hardware mechanism to prevent all accesses to enclave-owned
physical memory, allowing only the enclave’s code access. Any
sharing of microarchitectural resources by mutually distrusting
software may transmit private information via the availability
of these finite resources, measurable via the timing of certain
operations or other side channels. Microarchitectural isolation
is necessary to not only protect the confidentiality of enclave
execution (for example closing side channels through cache
state), but also to protect enclave integrity in the context of a
core that executes speculatively.
Instead of directly implementing isolated enclaves, the MI6
hardware implements flushing, constraints on core instruction
fetch, and a set of low-level isolation primitives (cf. Section
5) sufficient to partition each relevant sub-system of MI6 into
“protection domains” that are non-overlapping allocations of
machine resources. When programs are running on multiple
cores in different protection domains, in this steady state, MI6
guarantees non-interference and isolation of these domains.
The platform must also allow for transitions between dif-
ferent protection domain configurations in order to implement
enclaves. Following the example of [16], MI6 relies on a small
trusted security monitor (cf. Section 6.2), which executes in a
dedicated protection domain to compose the machine’s protec-
tion domains and constraints on execution into the high-level
properties of isolated enclaves. While the implementation de-
tails of an MI6 security monitor largely borrow from [37], and
are out of scope in this manuscript, Section 6.2 details the
aspects of the monitor relevant to the isolation of enclaves.
The trusted computing base (TCB) of the MI6 processor
includes the processor chip, memory (i.e., DRAM), as well as
the security monitor binary. The security monitor is the only
software running in the machine mode, which is the highest
privilege mode in RISC-V and is more privileged than the
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supervisor mode used by the untrusted OS [57]. MI6 isolates
the software inside an enclave from other software on the same
speculative out-of-order processor to satisfy Property 1.
2.3 Attacker Capability
We assume an insidious remote adversary able to exploit
software vulnerabilities expected to be present in large sys-
tem software. Specifically, we assume that an attacker can
compromise any operating system and hypervisor present on
the computer executing the enclave, and can launch malicious
enclaves. The attacker has complete knowledge of the enclave
platform’s architecture and microarchitecture, and the software
it loads. The attacker can analyze passively observed data, such
as page fault addresses, as well as mount active attacks, such
as memory probing, and cache tag state attacks (e.g., [65]).
The attacker can exploit speculative state, branch predictor
state, and other shared microarchitectural state in any software
attack, e.g., Spectre [33].
2.4 What’s Outside the Threat Model
MI6’s isolation mechanisms exclusively address software
attacks, and assume the absence of any adversary with phys-
ical access. We do not protect against attacks such as [11],
where the victim application leaks information via its public
API, and the leak occurs even if the victim runs on a dedi-
cated machine. We also consider any software attacks that rely
on sensor data to be physical attacks. MI6 does not protect
against physical attacks on memory, but can be augmented with
memory encryption and integrity verification exemplified by
processors such as Aegis [53] and Oblivious Random Access
Memory (ORAM) [23] [51] as in Ascend [22] to variously
defend against these attacks. ORAM overhead can be substan-
tially reduced if smart memory is assumed [2, 6]. MI6 does
not protect against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, assumes
correct underlying hardware, and does not protect against soft-
ware attacks that exploit hardware bugs (fault-injection attacks
such as rowhammer [31, 49]). Finally, we exclude attacks that
utilize shared performance counters.
3. RELATED WORK
3.1 Microarchitectural side channel attacks
Attacks that exploit microarchitectural side channels to leak
information come in many varieties. Attacks using cache
tag state-based channels are known to retrieve cryptographic
keys from a growing body of cryptographic implementations:
AES [9, 46], RSA [11], Diffie-Hellman [34], and elliptic-curve
cryptography [10], to name a few. Such attacks can be mounted
by unprivileged software sharing a computer with the victim
software [7].
Sophisticated channel modulation schemes such as flush
+reload [64] and variants of prime+probe [44] target the last-
level cache (LLC), which is shared by all cores in a socket.
The evict+reload variant of flush+reload uses cache contention
rather than flushing [44]. A less common yet viable strategy
corresponds to observing changes in coherence [63] or replace-
ment metadata [32]. Directories are readily reverse-engineered
to construct eviction sets in [62].
Recently, multiple security researchers (e.g., [25, 33, 40])
have found ways for an attacker to exploit speculative execution
to create a transmitter within victim code in order to leak
secrets. Spectre and Meltdown have exploited the fact that
code executing speculatively has unrestricted access to any
registers and memory, and a host of variants of these attacks
have been proposed. These attacks have motivated MI6.
3.2 Defending against side channel attacks
Set partitioning, i.e., not allowing occupancy of any cache
set by data from different protection domains, can disable
cache state-based channels. It has the advantage of requiring
no new hardware, provided groups of sets are allocated at page
granularity [39, 68] via page coloring [29, 54]. Sanctum uses
set partitioning to block cache timing attacks, as does MI6.
Intel’s Cache Allocation Technology (CAT) [24, 26] and its
variants (e.g., CATalyst [41]) provide a mechanism to configure
each logical process with a class of service, and allocates Last
Level Cache (LLC) cache ways to logical processes, falling
somewhat short of isolation. In CAT, access patterns may leak
through metadata updates on hitting loads, as the replacement
metadata is shared across protection domains. DAWG [32]
endows a set associative structure with a notion of protection
domains to provide strong isolation. Unlike CAT, DAWG
explicitly isolates cache replacement state. Page coloring can
be replaced with DAWG or another cache isolation mechanism
in MI6.
A alternative strategy to protect against cache timing at-
tacks separate from partitioning is to randomize interference
in the cache (e.g., RPcache [35, 56], Random Fill Cache [42],
Newcache [43], CEASER [47]), CEASER-S [48], or alter re-
placement policies (e.g., SHARP [61], RIC [27], [17]). In
the MI6 design, we do not allow adaptivity of cache area allo-
cated to an enclave to protect against cache occupancy attacks
(e.g., [50]) and therefore we cannot use these techniques.
MI6 uses techniques similar to [20] to achieve timing inde-
pendence (non-interference) in its memory system. To support
demand paging in a secure fashion in MI6 enclaves, page-level
ORAM as briefly described in Sanctum or the more efficient
approach of InvisiPage [3] can be used.
3.3 Secure Processors
A detailed review of secure processors is provided in [15].
Early architectures such as XOM [38], Aegis [53], ARM’s
TrustZone [4], and Bastion [14] did not consider side channel
attacks in their threat model.
Intel’s SGX [5, 45] adapted the ideas in XOM, Aegis and
Bastion to multi-core processors with a shared, coherent last-
level cache. SGX does not protect against cache timing attacks,
nor control flow speculation attacks [12]. Iso-X extends SGX
enclave allocation and does not protect against cache timing
attacks [18].
Sanctum [16] introduced a straightforward software-hardware
co-design to provide enclaves resistant to software attacks, in-
cluding those that exploit shared microarchitectural state in
a simple in-order processor. MI6 is similar to Sanctum, but
protects against a broader class of attacks including those that
use the cache/cache directory/DRAM controller bandwidth
channels. The cache hierarchy of MI6 corresponds to a mod-
ern processor as compared to the cache hierarchy modeled by
Sanctum, which did not include queues or arbitration logic.
Further, speculation in MI6 provides a rich attack surface. MI6
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introduces a microarchitecture-independent purge instruction
to flush the out-of-order pipeline. Keystone [30] borrows from
Sanctum to implement enclaves targeting standard RISC-V in-
order processors using RISC-V’s physical memory protection
primitive [57].
Komodo [19] builds a privileged software monitor on top
of ARM TrustZone that implements enclaves. Komodo, as
described in [19], does not support multi-processor execution,
and runs on an in-order processor. InvisiSpec [60] makes spec-
ulation invisible in the data cache hierarchy. This comes at a
significant performance cost, and does not preclude speculation
based attacks on other shared microarchitectural state.
4. BASELINE OOO PROCESSOR
MI6 is based on the open-source RiscyOO speculative OOO
processor [67]. RiscyOO implements most features of mod-
ern microprocessors, including register renaming, branch pre-
diction, non-blocking caches and TLBs, and superscalar and
speculative execution. In particular, RiscyOO can issue a load
speculatively even when older instructions have unresolved
branches or memory addresses. RiscyOO also has a shared
L2 cache which is coherent and inclusive with the private L1
caches of each core. We also refer to the shared L2 as the last
level cache (LLC). Therefore, RiscyOO contains cache-timing
side channels and is vulnerable to speculation-based attacks
like Spectre. The detailed configuration of RiscyOO used in
this paper can be found in Figure 4 in Section 7.
RiscyOO uses the open-source RISC-V instruction set [1],
and has been prototyped on AWS F1 FPGAs. Its FPGA im-
plementation boots Linux and completes SPEC CINT2006
benchmarks with the largest input size (ref input) in slightly
more than a day. RiscyOO is a great platform that we can build
secure enclaves on: it is vastly more complex than the imple-
mentation of Sanctum in [16], and presents new challenges for
security.
4.1 Hardware Modifications
Enclave support in a modern processor system require three
interventions: 1. Physical address protection and isolation
through the memory hierarchy. 2. A rigorous implementation
of a “purge” operation to scrub each type of physical resource
that can be separately allocated to an enclave. 3. A specula-
tion guard for the security monitor: this software has access
to all physical addresses, and must not speculatively load ad-
dresses, nor should it speculatively fetch outside of the security
monitor’s own binary.
Specifically, we summarize the the hardware modifications
used by MI6 to support enclaves below. The details of each
modification will be discussed in the rest of paper.
• Flushing microarchitectural states: Sections 6 and 7.1.
• Page-walk check: Section 5.3.
• Turning off speculation and checking instruction fetches
in machine mode: Sections 6.2 and 7.5.
• LLC set-partitioning: Sections 5.2 and 7.2.
• MSHR partitioning in LLC: Sections 5.2 and 7.3.
• Sizing LLC MSHR: Sections 5.2 and 7.3.
• Other LLC changes to block side-channels: Sections 5.4.3
and 7.4.
5. STEADY STATE ISOLATION
When examining the interactions between two programs,
there are two cases to consider: the first is when the two pro-
grams are running on different cores (this section), and the
second is when the two programs run on the same core but at
different times (cf. Section 6).
From an ISA-level point of view, two programs are indepen-
dent if a program’s output does not depend on another program.
We call this architectural isolation. This captures the interac-
tion of instructions in the ISA such as loads and stores, but it
does not include side channels such as timing.
Beyond the basic operations provided by the ISA, we assume
that the precise time of any microarchitectural event within a
core (instruction fetch, issue, execute, commit, etc.) can be
measured by the program running on the core. This conser-
vatively abstracts a cleverly engineered program’s ability to
measure latencies.
First, we define our guarantee of weak timing independence
depending on the underlying cause of variation in timing. If the
timing variation is due to one program waiting multiple cycles
for another core to release a reserved resource, we define major
timing leak. On the other hand, if the timing variation is due
to two programs compete for a resource within a single clock
cycle, requiring per-cycle arbitration, we define minor timing
leakage. Two programs have weak timing independence if
they are architecturally isolated and only exhibit minor timing
leakage (cf. Sections 5.2 and 5.3). Two programs have strong
timing independence if they are architecturally isolated and
have neither flavor of timing leak (cf. Section 5.4).
In Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we ensure that programs using
disjoint protection domains have weak timing independence.
Section 5.4 achieves strong timing independence. If two pro-
grams use resources from disjoint microarchitectural protection
domains, then they are timing independent.
Definitions and Assumptions: We consider a program to be
the collection of all the instructions running on a core in super-
visor and lower privilege modes and the corresponding initial
data, and we assume no machine mode code is run as part of
the enclave program or on the program’s behalf during the
program’s lifetime. We ignore machine mode because soft-
ware in machine mode can tamper with arbitrary configuration
registers and alter active protection domains. Including su-
pervisor mode in our analysis simplifies the problem because
we do not have to worry about what the operating system is
doing to provide services such as virtual memory to user mode
programs. All configuration and usage of virtual memory falls
entirely within a program to keep the security monitor as lean
as possible and so minor page table operations do not cause an
enclave exit to the security monitor.
Each program has a set of physical addresses it accesses.
There are many ways a program can access a physical address.
When virtual memory is off, a physical address is accessed
for each instruction fetch and for each load and store. When
virtual memory is on, physical addresses are also accessed for
page table walks. Also since RiscyOO is an aggressive out-
of-order execution processor, speculative instruction fetches,
speculative loads, and speculative page table walks also cause
physical memory accesses even if the speculation was incorrect.
When talking about the set of all physical addresses accessed
by a program, we mean the physical addresses of all the above
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physical memory accesses, even the speculative ones.
We also assume that the entire address space is normal mem-
ory, not memory-mapped I/O since we do not trust devices and
drivers.
5.1 Establishing Architectural Isolation
If two programs do not share any addresses, then without
using the timing of microarchitectural events, the execution of
one program cannot affect the other. Therefore, disjoint address
spaces imply that programs are architecturally isolated.
5.2 Establishing Weak Timing Independence
Unfortunately, having disjoint address spaces between pro-
grams, while enough for architectural isolation, is not enough
even for weak timing independence.
Cache Partitioning: As an example, consider programs p1
and p2 which access disjoint address spaces. If the two pro-
grams access physical addresses a1 and a2 in the same L2
cache set, then accesses from p1 to a1 can cause a2 to get
evicted causing p2 to see a miss instead of a hit next time p2
accesses a2.
This issue stems from the two programs dynamically sharing
resources (in this case entries in the same cache set). The on-
demand transition of resources from one program to the other
is observable by the programs and can therefore be used to infer
the demand of the other program. In order to get around this
problem and achieve weak (or strong) timing independence,
caches need to be statically partitioned between programs.
MI6 partitions the cache through set partitioning. Similar
to Sanctum [16], MI6 divides equally the physical memory
(DRAM) into multiple contiguous DRAM regions. MI6 mod-
ifies the LLC cache indexing function so that each pair of
DRAM regions map to disjoint cache sets. That is, the higher
bits of the original LLC index are replaced by the DRAM-
region ID, which is the highest bits of the physical address
(e.g., the highest 6 bits for 64 DRAM regions). Two programs
using set partitioning must only use physical addresses that
map to disjoint DRAM regions in order to avoid timing leakage
through dynamic sharing of the cache.
MSHR Partitioning: The L2 cache in RiscyOO can only
handle a fixed number of requests at a time. These requests are
tracked using miss status handling registers (MSHRs). If there
are no free MSHRs, then the L2 cannot take any more requests
and causes multiple cycles of backpressure for the child L1
caches trying to send requests.
Consider programs p1 and p2 where p1 is causing many
cache misses and its requests fill the L2’s MSHRs. If p2 then
causes a cache miss, there will be no MSHR available for p2
and the request will be stalled. This is a timing variation in p2
that is caused by p1 and therefore a major timing leak.
To avoid this timing leak, MI6 partitions the MSHRs in
the LLC. Since only processes that are actively running on
the processor cores can occupy MSHRs, MI6 divides equally
the MSHRs in the LLC by the number of processor cores, and
statically associates each MSHR partition with a processor core.
p1 using all of its allocated MSHRs will not affect whether or
not a request from p2 is stalled due to backpressure.
Sizing the MSHRs to Avoid DRAM Backpressure: Say
that dmax is the maximum number of outstanding requests the
DRAM controller can handle. After dmax in-flight requests, the
DRAM controller asserts backpressure and prevents further re-
quests from being enqueued into it. If the DRAM controller is
asserting backpressure, then DRAM requests will get delayed
causing a major timing leak.
In RiscyOO, every request sent to the DRAM controller
comes from an L2 request in an MSHR. Moreover, each request
put into an MSHR can send up to two DRAM requests during
its lifetime: one for a possible write back and one for a read
request. Therefore, for a machine with a DRAM controller
accepting dmax outstanding requests, the number of MSHRs in
the cache needs to be at most dmax/2. That amounts to about
dmax/(2N) MSHRs per core, where N is the number of cores.
DRAM Controller Latency: Another complication of en-
suring timing independence is the DRAM and the DRAM
controller. DRAM controllers often reorder requests so that
requests to the same bank are done back-to-back to increase
the achieved bandwidth of the DRAM.
Consider programs p1 and p2 where p1 is accessing ad-
dresses in DRAM bank 0, and p2 is accessing addresses in
DRAM banks 1, 2, and 3. If p1 and p2 send interleaved
requests to DRAM, and p1’s requests were all to the same
bank, a reordering DRAM controller would perform p1’s re-
quests back-to-back, changing the timing of p2’s requests. This
changes the timing of p2 based on p1, breaking weak timing
independence between the two programs.
For weak (or strong) timing independence, MI6 must either
use a DRAM controller with a constant latency or use a more
sophisticated DRAM controller that is aware of protection
domains and associated DRAM regions and ensures timing in-
dependence across protection domains. That is, optimizations
such as row buffer are allowed within a protection domain but
not across protection domains. The DRAM controller model
RiscyOO used for evaluation has a constant latency, and we
leave the exploration of variable latency DRAM controllers
that are timing independent to future work.
5.3 Address Validation for Protection Domains
Unlike Sanctum, in MI6 an enclave does not share virtual
address space with untrusted software, as explored in Sec-
tion 6.2. Coupled with the mechanism of routing page faults
to an enclave, and per-enclave page tables, this blocks the
page fault and page access side channel and prevents attacks
such as [13, 59], where the untrusted OS views page faults or
accesses.
In order to achieve timing independence, programs need to
be able to ensure they only use certain cache sets and no other
programs use those sets. This restriction on address usage
includes all accesses to memory. It is easy to write a program
that only performs loads and stores on certain addresses, but
much harder to ensure that the program will not emit specula-
tive accesses or page table walks to memory that fall outside
that range. It is also much harder to ensure another program
will stay outside of your address range.
To make set partitioning easier, MI6 has hardware support
to ensure all physical accesses fall within the specified DRAM
regions (and therefore cache sets) allocated to the running
program. Each core in MI6 has a machine-mode modifiable
bitvector containing a bit for each DRAM region determining
if that region can be accessed or not. If the program makes an
access (speculative or non-speculative) to an address outside
the allocated cache sets, the core will not emit the access to
that location and will raise an exception if that access ends up
becoming non-speculative.
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We need to check the DRAM region for each physical cache
access. MI6 performs an optimization to simplify the design by
caching DRAM region permissions in the TLB. Each DRAM
region is large enough and has proper alignment so that no
4 KB page falls in two DRAM regions. Therefore, if a page
table walk determines an access to a specified page is legal,
the translation is added to the TLB and the accesses using
the translation are all legal until the DRAM region allocation
changes. To support programs using physical addresses, the
security monitor configures cores to trap on virtual memory
management instructions so the security monitor can swap in
an identity page table when programs try to turn off virtual
memory. Section 6.2 describes how the TLB is maintained to
ensure state transitions do not violate isolation.
5.4 Achieving Strong Timing Independence
This section presents the remaining modifications required
to achieve strong timing independence, and therefore Property
1. The mechanisms introduced in Section 5.2 cannot achieve
strong timing independence primarily because of the shared
LLC. We first explain the structure of LLC in RiscyOO in
Section 5.4.1, then show the possible minor leakages that break
strong timing independence in Section 5.4.2, and present our
solution in Section 5.4.3. We also analyze the performance
cost qualitatively in Section 5.4.4.
5.4.1 Understanding the LLC of RiscyOO
Shared last level cache (LLC)
Core 0
DRAM
Core 1
Figure 1: Integration
of LLC in RiscyOO
Figure 2 shows the internal de-
tails of the LLC.
Figure 1 shows how the LLC is
integrated in a two-core RiscyOO
machine. The LLC uses an MSI
directory-based cache coherency
protocol [55], and it uses a dedi-
cated link to communicate cache-
coherence messages with the L1s
in each processor core. Each link
contains three independent FIFOs
to transfer (1) upgrade requests
from the L1, (2) downgrade re-
sponses from the L1, and (3) upgrade responses and down-
grade requests from the LLC, respectively [55]. The LLC is
connected to the DRAM controller using a pair of FIFOs, and
the DRAM controller sends responses only for reads.
The LLC contains MSHRs and a cache-access pipeline.
Every incoming message sent to the LLC, including L1 up-
grade requests, L1 downgrade responses and DRAM responses,
needs to go through the cache-access pipeline to access the
tag and data SRAMs of the LLC. An upgrade request from
L1 also needs to reserve an MSHR entry before entering the
pipeline. A DRAM response is buffered in the MSHR entry
that initiates the corresponding DRAM read request before it
enters the pipeline, and thus there is no backpressure on DRAM
response.
After a message finishes accessing the SRAMs in the pipeline,
it is processed at the end of the pipeline. After the processing,
an L1 upgrade request could be ready to respond, and in this
case we enter the MSHR index of the request into a FIFO, i.e.,
UQ in Figure 2, and the response data is buffered in the MSHR
entry. The depth of UQ is equal to the number of MSHRs so
it will never backpressure the pipeline. In other cases where
a cache replacement or a cache miss occurs, the L1 upgrade
request that causes the replacement or cache miss needs to
request DRAM. In this case, we enter its MSHR index into a
FIFO, i.e., DQ in Figure 2, and buffer the data in the MSHR
entry if writeback is needed. The depth of DQ is also equal
to the number of MSHRs, so it will also never backpressure
the pipeline. That is, the cache-access pipeline can never be
backpressured.
The final piece in the LLC is the Downgrade-L1 logic in
Figure 2. Every cycle, the logic looks for an MSHR entry that
needs to downgrade any L1s, and sends the downgrade request.
Cache-access pipeline
Core 0 downgrade resp
Core 1 downgrade resp
Core 0 upgrade req
Core 1 upgrade req
Process
Downgrade-L1
DRAM resp DRAM req
MSHR index to 
send upgrade resp
Downgrade req
Core 0
Core 1
MSHR index to 
send DRAM req
UQ
DQM
SH
Rs
Figure 2: Internal microarchitecture of LLC in RiscyOO
5.4.2 Minor Timing Leakages in LLC
Section 5.2 has partitioned the storage elements in the LLC,
i.e., cache arrays and MSHRs, to prevent major timing leakages.
However, there are still other shared resources in the LLC that
are contended for by messages belonging to different cores
and potentially different protection domains. As long as such
contention exists, minor timing leakage is possible. Here, we
enumerate all such contended resources.
Entry port of the cache-access pipeline: All the incoming
messages are contending on the entry into the cache-access
pipeline through a two-level mux as shown in Figure 2. If two
messages from two different cores arrive at the LLC at the
same time, then one message will block another for a cycle.
This can lead to minor timing leakage. Contention between
different types of messages from different cores can also form
a minor leakage, e.g., a DRAM response for a miss by core 0
and a L1 upgrade request from core 1.
Downgrade-L1 logic: All the MSHR entries that need to send
downgrade requests are contending on the Downgrade-L1 logic
to send downgrade requests. If the arbitration is not fair, then
a large number of MSHR entries of core 0 that need to send
downgrade requests can block MSHR entries of core 1 from
sending downgrade requests.
UQ and Downgrade requests: A head-of-line block in UQ
caused by a response to core 0 can stall a later response to core
1 in UQ. The downgrade requests sent by the Downgrade-L1
logic also contend with the responses in UQ on the outgoing
port to processor cores.
DQ: If an MSHR entry is entered into DQ because of a cache
miss without replacement, then it only needs to send one
DRAM read request when it is dequeued from DQ. This will
not block the dequeue port of DQ or lead to leakage. However,
if an MSHR entry enters DQ because of the completion of
cache replacement, then it needs to send not only a DRAM
writeback request, but also a DRAM read request. This is
because the MSHR entry must have missed in the LLC. In this
case, the dequeue port of DQ will be blocked for one cycle in
order to send both requests to DRAM. This block may delay
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later requests in DQ, creating minor timing leakage.
We have enumerated all instances of contention in the LLC
that can create minor timing leakage. It should be noted that the
DRAM-response port is not a source of leakage, even though
responses for cache misses from different cores all go through
this port. This is because the DRAM-response port is never
backpressured as explained in Section 5.4.1.
5.4.3 LLC with Strong Timing Independence
Figure 3 shows the microarchitecture of the LLC in MI6
that prevents all the above minor timing leakages and achieves
strong timing independence. We explain the changes made to
handle each of the contended resources listed in Section 5.4.2.
Cache-access pipeline Process
Downgrade-L1
DRAM resp
DRAM req
MSHR index to send 
upgrade resp
Downgrade req
C
or
e 
1
MSHR index to 
send DRAM req
UQ1
DQRound-robin 
arbiter
UQ0 C
or
e 
0
Retry L1 upgrade req when replacement finishes
Core 1 downgrade resp
Core 1 upgrade req
DRAM resp for Core 1 miss C
or
e 
1
M
SH
R
s
Core 0 downgrade resp
Core 0 upgrade req
C
or
e 
0
M
SH
R
s
DRAM resp for Core 0 miss
Downgrade-L1
Figure 3: Microarchitecture of LLC in MI6 to achieve mi-
croarchitectural isolation
Entry port of the cache-access pipeline: Instead of first
merging incoming messages of the same type and then merging
different message types, the LLC in Figure 3 first merges all
incoming messages for the same core, including L1 upgrade re-
quests, L1 downgrade responses, and DRAM responses for the
misses caused by the core. Contention between messages for
the same core (and thus the same protection domain) will not
cause any leakage. After merging messages for the same core,
we use a round-robin arbiter to arbitrate messages from differ-
ent cores before they enter the cache-access pipeline. Consider
the case where we have N cores with IDs 0 . . .N−1. In this
case, in cycle T , only one message from core T %N (T modulo
N) can enter the pipeline. It should be noted that even if there
is no incoming message for this core, messages from other
cores cannot proceed. Since the cache-access pipeline has no
backpressure (Section 5.4.1), the round-robin arbiter ensures
that whether messages from a given core can enter the pipeline
is independent from the activity of other cores or protection
domains. That is, strong timing independence is achieved at
this entry port.
Downgrade-L1 logic: There are two approaches to solve
the contention in the Downgrade-L1 logic. In the first ap-
proach, given that MI6 has already partitioned the MSHRs
across processor cores, instead of checking all the MSHRs,
the Downgrade-L1 logic examines only one MSHR partition
for a single core at each cycle. The logic iterates through all
partitions in a round-robin fashion, providing timing indepen-
dence. The logic will still spend a cycle on a partition even
if no MSHR in the partition has downgrade request to send.
This ensures that whether the MSHRs for a given core can
send downgrade requests is independent from other cores or
protection domains. In the second approach, which we follow,
we duplicate the Downgrade-L1 logic for each MSHR parti-
tion. Each copy of the Downgrade-L1 logic is therefore only
responsible for one MSHR partition, thereby removing any
contention (cf. Figure 3).
UQ and Downgrade requests: To resolve the timing depen-
dence due to UQ, we have split the original UQ into multiple
FIFOs (see Figure 3). That is, UQi keeps only the MSHR
indexes for core i, and the depth of UQi is equal to the size
of the MSHR partition for core i. Thus, head-of-line blocking
of UQi is simply a stall within responses for core i, i.e., there
is no timing dependence across different cores or protection
domains. It should be noted that the total number of entries of
all the UQs is still equal to the total number of MSHRs, that is,
there is no area overhead.
After the split of UQ, a downgrade request sent to core i can
contend only with responses to core i in UQi. Consider the case
that the downgrade request is initiated by an upgrade request
from core j. In this case, the address requested by core j is in
the same cache set as the downgrading address owned by core i.
Thus, cores i and j must be in the same protection domain (see
Section 5.2), e.g., a multithreaded enclave is assigned to cores
i and j. Therefore, the contention between UQ and downgrade
requests cannot influence timing across protection domains.
DQ: The key to solve the problem is to have the dequeue of
an MSHR index from DQ always take one cycle, in particular
for MSHR entries that are completing cache replacement. In
this way, the dequeue port of DQ will never be blocked, and
there is no timing influence with DQ. Consider an MSHR entry
which enters DQ because of completing cache replacement.
In Figure 3, when the MSHR index is entered into DQ, we
set a retry bit in the MSHR entry. When the MSHR index
is dequeued from DQ, it sends only the writeback request
to DRAM, so the dequeue takes only one cycle. An MSHR
entry with the retry bit set will try to re-enter the cache-access
pipeline, and enters DQ again as a pure cache miss to issue
the DRAM read request. The re-entry only contends with
messages for the same core, and will not create new leakage.
The cache slot is also locked to the MSHR entry so that other
upgrade requests cannot occupy the slot.
5.4.4 Qualitative Analysis of Performance Impact
First, we note that the split of UQ into multiple FIFOs has
zero performance overhead. The retry of a request that finishes
replacement will increase the total processing latency of this
request by a few cycles. However, since the request needs to
read DRAM, this increase is negligible.
The Downgrade-L1 logic was duplicated and therefore has
zero performance overhead. If we had chosen to operate the
logic in the round-robin way, then the latency to downgrade
L1s may increase proportionately to the total number of cores.
The performance overhead comes mainly from the round-
robin arbiter in front of the cache-access pipeline. The arbiter
gives each core 1/N of the SRAM bandwidth, where N is the
total number of cores. It should be noted that even without
the arbiter, messages from N cores are still contending on the
bandwidth of the SRAM. Therefore, there is no bandwidth loss
in the average case. Performance will decrease if the traffic
from each core is bursty. This is not a big problem for a small
multiprocessor with 2 or 4 cores, because the LLC can still
take a request from a given core every 2 or 4 cycles, and the
core typically will not miss in L1 every cycle. This issue will
be exacerbated as the number of cores increases, but it depends
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strongly on the timing and contention of memory accesses
from different cores.
The arbiter also introduces extra latency in accessing the
pipeline, i.e., a message from a given core has to wait for its
turn to enter the pipeline. The average latency is roughly N/2
cycles. We evaluate the performance impact of the increased
latency in Section 7.4.
6. ISOLATION ACROSS PROTECTION
DOMAIN TRANSITIONS
In addition to achieving isolation of programs scheduled con-
currently onto different cores in the system, we must achieve
isolation between programs scheduled to use the same core at
different times.
As described earlier, MI6 relies on flushing of microarchitec-
tural state to erase any program-dependent microarchitectural
state when scheduling a new protection domain onto the core.
Operationally, we add a microarchitectural purge instruction
to achieve this; below, we consider the specifics of purge by
visiting each module it scrubs. Section 6.2 discusses how the
privileged security monitor, which occupies a dedicated pro-
tection domain and executes at highest privilege, orchestrates
the low-level operations to implement a secure context switch
across protection domains.
6.1 purge instruction
In-flight instructions: The out-of-order core consists of many
modules containing bookkeeping for in-flight instructions in-
cluding the register renaming table, register free list, reorder
buffer, issue queues, scoreboard, speculation tag manager, load
store queue (with corresponding MSHRs), store buffers, and
various FIFOs, and smaller modules. Between contexts, all of
these states must correspond to “no instruction is currently in
the processor pipeline” in order to achieve a comprehensive
flush. The baseline RiscyOO processor correctly flushes these
states on privilege change to handle read after write hazards
when changing the privilege level.
A multitude of states throughout the modules of the out-of-
order core equivalently describe an empty pipeline. For exam-
ple, a complete register free list indicates an empty pipeline,
but there exist multiple permutations of the free list. Interest-
ingly, this does not require special consideration so long as
these equivalent “free” states are not distinguishable by any
software. A similar situation pertains to the issue queue, from
where instructions are issued to execute when ready. In the
RiscyOO processor, the issue queue is a circular buffer with as-
sociated head and tail pointers. Any configuration where head
and tail pointers are equal maps to an empty state, yet these are
entirely indistinguishable by software means. While not appli-
cable in the case of RiscyOO’s issue queue, this module would
require additional care to correctly flush program-dependent
state in some priority queues, such as the MIPS R10000 [66],
which favors issuing instructions from low-numbered slots in
the queue.
Branch predictor structures: Branch predictors were demon-
strated as a surface for hijacking speculative execution as part
of Spectre [33]. These structures, being deeply stateful, can
also transmit information about the control flow of a previously
scheduled program via the branch predictions observed after
a context switch. To purge the branch predictor state, the
branch predictor must reach a well-defined public state, for
example via a reset to its initial state. In order to reduce the
overhead of cold branch prediction after each context switch,
the processor may opt to implement primitives for saving and
restoring predictor state, if practical.
L1 Caches, TLBs, and translation caches: Attacks exploit-
ing shared cache tag state to observe secret-dependent changes
in memory access latency are a well-explored field, offering
increasingly practical examples of private state leakage via the
cache. Any cache timing attack may use not only the shared
L2 cache (which MI6 partitions to address this class of vulner-
ability), but also the L1 caches, which are time-shared by the
programs scheduled onto the same core. In order to obviate
these attack surfaces, L1 caches, along with TLBs (both L1 and
L2) and translation caches, must be flushed on context switches.
(TLBs and translation caches are all private to the core.) In
addition to the tag state, the cache lines’ replacement policy
state must also be scrubbed; RiscyOO fortunately employs a
pseudo-random replacement policy with no replacement state.
The TLBs (both L1 and L2) and translation caches use set as-
sociative structures with LRU replacement policies. RiscyOO’s
implementation of the LRU policy is self-cleaning: when no
line’s data is present in a set, new lines are filled in a pre-
defined order; the act of filling an LRU cache to prime it for
eviction scrubs private information in the replacement state.
A noteworthy observation: L2 cache sets need only be
scrubbed when re-allocating physical memory. Protection
domains use disjoint regions of physical memory, which cor-
respond to disjoint sets in the L2 via set coloring. L2 lines
belonging to a de-scheduled protection domain are inaccessible
and can remain in the L2 until the domain is scheduled.
MI6 does not allow for memory shared between arbitrary
protection domains; all communication between domains is
mediated by a security monitor, as described in Section 6.2.
6.2 Security Monitor Functionality
As in Sanctum [16], we employ a software security monitor
to map the high-level semantics of enclaves onto the low-level
invariants implemented by the hardware. While the imple-
mentation of a security monitor for MI6 is not a contribution
of this manuscript, this section briefly describes its required
functionality, and where it differs slightly from the prior con-
struction [37] for Sanctum. The security monitor interposes
on scheduling and physical resource allocation decisions made
by the untrusted OS to assert that a given enclave’s resources
do not overlap with any other software, and to scrub these
resources before they are available for re-allocation. In MI6,
the security monitor considers two classes of resources: core
state, and memory; both include their respective space of sub-
tle side effects these resources have on the memory hierarchy,
microarchitecture, and the network-on-chip. When an OS re-
quests enclaves be scheduled or de-scheduled, the security
monitor uses purge, as described above, to scrub a core when
scheduling enclaves (to create a pristine environment free of
adversarial influence) and when de-scheduling enclaves, to
erase side effects of enclave execution. Likewise, before mem-
ory is granted to an enclave, or when an enclave is destroyed,
the security monitor must be invoked to scrub it before it can
be given to a new owner. During steady-state execution, the
security monitor is de-scheduled, and protection domains are
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isolated via the mechanism is described in Section 5.3.
The monitor also interposes on an enclave’s asynchronous
events and exceptions in order to safely de-schedule the enclave
before delegating control to the OS handler; the OS observes
the event as occurring at the syscall that scheduled the enclave.
The security monitor itself occupies a dedicated protection
domain outside the OS’s reach, and statically reserves suffi-
cient amount of physical memory for text and data structures
implementing the monitor’s limited functionality. The security
monitor sets up a physical memory protection primitive (PAR:
Sanctum’s protected address region) to ensure its own integrity
from all other software.
All protection domains with the exception of the security
monitor execute in virtual memory; the operating system trans-
parently uses an identity page table to access physical ad-
dresses. When protection domains are created or destroyed,
stale translations system-wide must be scrubbed: the security
monitor forces a TLB shootdown during these transitions to
ensure cached translations remain coherent with the system’s
current security policy. Because no translations exist to map
any virtual address in a protection domain to a physical address
outside the protection domain (except as described at the end of
the section), speculative fetches and loads will not fall outside
protection domain boundaries, and uphold isolation.
As described in Section 5.3, MI6 ensures no protection do-
main may access the memory of another (with the notable
exception of the security monitor, which relies on a restricted
mode of execution to sidestep any speculative misbehavior, as
described below), resulting in straightforward isolation in the
L2 cache via page coloring. Of course, enclaves must occa-
sionally communicate with other software, at a minimum to
receive inputs and produce outputs. While Sanctum and SGX
allowed for rich communication between an enclave and its
host (the untrusted Linux processor in whose address space
the enclaved process exists), MI6 cannot allow sharing any
portion of the address space with untrusted software in order
to silo speculative execution. The security monitor implements
explicit messaging between protection domains by allowing
a sender to request a message to be copied from the send-
ing domain to a pre-allocated buffer in the receiving domain.
Sanctum’s mailbox primitive is one such mechanism, allow-
ing enclaves to send and receive authenticated private 64 Byte
messages (local attestation). MI6 extends this primitive to also
implement a privileged memcopy between an enclave and the
untrusted software via an agreed-upon pair of buffers of equal
size. The security monitor responds to an enclave’s request
to “read” the OS buffer by copying its contents to the enclave,
and to “write” it by copying from the enclave’s buffer to OS
memory. The security monitor’s handling of the primitives
above does not depend on the transmitted data, and an en-
clave’s invocation of these APIs is not considered private. The
security monitor therefore need not perform a purge when it
mediates communication. These primitives are a restriction
to the more permissive communication mechanism allowed
by SGX and Sanctum, so as to defend against timing attacks
on shared memory, including those that exploit speculative
execution.
Allowing an enclave to interact with the outside world, even
only through the security monitor, has implications for our
definition of security: instead of leaking its completion time,
the enclave also transmits the timing and sequence of its inter-
actions to a potential adversary. Any communications received
from untrusted software are untrusted, and a potential influence
channel. The enclave is responsible for padding the timing
of its interactions, and tolerating malicious responses. The
padding can be to a constant value for zero leakage, or some
value from a fixed size set to limit leakage [21].
Protection domains other than the security monitor (enclaves,
untrusted software) share no resources with one another, so
side effects of speculative execution within these domains are
not visible across protection domain boundaries. Cores exe-
cuting these protection domains may therefore speculate with
no restrictions. This is not the case for the security monitor’s
domain, which executes with highest privilege, and may access
arbitrary virtual memory. As in [16], the security monitor’s
code is trusted to maintain its own integrity, and to not violate
the isolation of other domains. This trust is insufficient in
MI6, and we must restrict speculative execution of the secu-
rity monitor to prevent side effects of mis-speculated fetches
and accesses from being observable across protection domain
boundaries. We achieve this by restricting instruction fetch
to a range of addresses corresponding to the security monitor,
and by throttling register renaming in machine-mode execution
(exclusively used by the security monitor), effectively seri-
alizing execution. Restricting instruction fetch prevents the
security monitor from leaking information via the shared cache
by jumping/branching to a data-dependent address visible to
an adversary. Further, we replicate the security monitor’s code
within each enclave (these replicas contain nothing confiden-
tial and protect their integrity via PAR: Sanctum’s physical
memory protection mechanism), so invoking an enclave’s com-
munication primitive does not leave unintended side effects:
the monitor’s text is not shared by protection domains, and
the memcopy is non-speculative (see above), and touches only
the two buffers the enclave explicitly intends to access. A
more sophisticated implementation that allows for safe specu-
lation within the security monitor while guaranteeing isolation,
and allows finer-grained communication between protection
domains, is deferred to future work.
6.3 Strong Isolation Argument
In steady-state execution, the enclave is straightforwardly
isolated through its uniquely allocated core and address range.
Since it does not share a core with any other software, its
core-local micro-architectural state is private. Since it does not
share an allocated address range with any threads running on
other cores, the page invariant circuit ensures external software
is not able to access the enclave’s physical memory, and the
enclave is not able to access addresses outside its address range,
including speculative accesses. Page coloring results in cache
set isolation in the shared cache, and MSHR partitioning and
other changes result in memory request timing isolation in
the cache hierarchy. The enclaved program is responsible for
safeguarding the timing of its public operations.
In transient execution, which includes enclave scheduling,
de-scheduling, creation, and destruction, the enclave is isolated
by the security monitor sanitizing architectural and micro-
architectural state within the core during each event. When the
security monitor is called to perform one of the enclave tran-
sient operations, the core switches to machine mode, and that
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switch causes the pipeline to flush all in-flight speculation from
the previously executing program. The security monitor uses
the purge instruction to fully flush all the mircoarchitectural
state from the processor and it runs a software routine to scrub
the architectural state to a known initial state. Before returning
control to software outside machine mode, the security monitor
re-purges relevant architectural and micro-architectural state
to grant the incoming software a fresh execution environment.
A subtle complication in this process is the security moni-
tor’s own unrestricted access to physical memory. Speculative
misbehavior within the security monitor itself might be able to
circumvent the isolation of private enclave memory, so we do
not speculate in machine mode.
7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performance overheads of MI6 come from (1) flushing
per-core microarchitectural states on a context switch, (2) par-
titioning the shared last level cache (LLC), (3) partitioning and
sizing the MSHRs in LLC, (4) the round-robin arbiter for the
LLC pipeline, and (5) turning off speculation in machine mode.
Here, we do not evaluate the performance overheads of the
changes made in Section 5.4.3 outside of the arbiter due to the
reasons explained in Section 5.4.4. We evaluate each of these
five overheads in Sections 7.1 to 7.5, respectively, and summa-
rize the overall performance overheads of MI6 in Section 7.6.
Overheads (1) and (5) apply only to enclave applications while
overheads (2), (3) and (4) apply to all processes. Turning off
speculation is needed only when the security monitor transfers
data on behalf of the enclave to and from the outside world.
We expect these to be rare events which typically only happen
at the beginning and end of enclave execution, so we will not
take into account the effect of turning off speculation when
evaluating the overall performance overheads of MI6 in Sec-
tion 7.6.
We use the following 7 variants of the RiscyOO processor:
1. BASE: the baseline insecure RiscyOO processor with
parameters listed in Figure 4.
2. FLUSH: flushes per-core microarchitectural states at ev-
ery context switch on top of the BASE processor (used
in Section 7.1).
3. PART: set-partitions the LLC of the BASE processor
(used in Section 7.2).
4. MISS: changes the organization of LLC MSHRs of the
BASE processor to model the effect of LLC-MSHR par-
titioning and sizing (used in Section 7.3).
5. ARB: increases the LLC pipeline latency of the BASE
processor to model the effect of the round-robin arbiter
for the LLC pipeline (used in Section 7.4).
6. NONSPEC: executes memory instructions non-speculatively
on top of the BASE processor (used in Section 7.5).
7. F+P+M+A: the combination of FLUSH, PART, MISS
and ARB (used in Section 7.6).
We prototyped all 7 processors on AWS F1 FPGAs, and ran
SPEC CINT2006 benchmarks with the ref input size. We
did not run benchmark perlbench because we could not cross-
compile it to RISC-V. For benchmarks with multiple ref inputs,
we present the aggregate performance number over all the
inputs. In most cases, all benchmarks ran to completion under
Linux without sampling. The only exception is the evaluation
of turning off speculation, in which case we truncate the runs
because the processor without speculation becomes too slow
to finish the benchmarks (see Section 7.5).
Front-end 2-wide superscalar fetch/decode/rename
256-entry direct-mapped BTB
tournament branch predictor as in Alpha 21264 [28]
8-entry return address stack
Execution 80-entry ROB with 2-way insert/commit
Engine Total 4 pipelines: 2 ALU, 1 MEM, 1 FP/MUL/DIV
16-entry IQ per pipeline
Ld-St Unit 24-entry LQ, 14-entry SQ, 4-entry SB (each 64B wide)
L1 TLBs Both I and D are 32-entry, fully associative,
D TLB has max 4 requests
L2 TLB Private to each core, 1024-entry, 4-way associative
max 2 requests
Includes a translation cache which contains 24 fully
associative entries for each intermediate translation step
L1 Caches Both I and D are 32KB, 8-way associative, max 8 requests
L2 Cache 1MB, 16-way, max 16 requests
(LLC) coherent with I and D
Memory 2GB, 120-cycle latency, max 24 requests
(12.8GB/s for 2GHz clock)
Figure 4: Insecure baseline (BASE) configuration
7.1 Flushing Per-Core Microarchitectural State
Methodology: We compare the single-core performance of
BASE and FLUSH to study the influence of flushing per-
core microarchitectural states, including TLBs, L1 caches and
branch predictors. In FLUSH, these states are flushed whenever
the processor takes a trap (i.e., an exception or an interrupt) or
returns from trap handling. In one cycle, the hardware can only
flush a few entries of L1 caches, TLBs and branch predictors.
Each L1 cache has 512 cache lines, we invalidate one line per
cycle. We cannot invalidate a whole set (i.e., 8 lines) per cycle,
because the coherence protocol used in RiscyOO requires L1
to notify L2 even for the invalidation of a clean line. Entries
in TLBs and branch predictors can be discarded directly. The
fully associative L1 TLBs can be flushed in one cycle. The L2
TLB has 256 sets (each set has 4 entries) and we discard one
set per cycle. For the tournament branch predictor, the largest
table has 4096 entries (each of 2 bits), and we discard 8 entries
per cycle. L2 can sustain a bandwidth of one eviction per cycle,
though the latency of completing an eviction is larger than one
cycle. All these flushes done in parallel take 512 cycles to
complete, during which time the processor idles.
The stall time for flushing is not the only cost. When the
application resumes from trap handling, the L1 caches, TLBs
and branch predictors are all “cold,” and it takes time to warm
them up. This will lead to more misses in caches and TLBs,
and more branch mispredictions.
Results: Figure 5 shows the increased execution time caused
by flushing for each benchmark. The last column shows the
average across all benchmarks. Lower bars mean less perfor-
mance overheads. The average overhead in execution time is
5.4%, and the maximum overhead is 10.9% (in benchmark
astar). As explained earlier, these overheads are caused by
(1) the stall time waiting for flushes to be completed, (2) the
additional cache and TLB misses caused by the cold start after
flushing, and (3) the additional branch mispredictions caused
by the cold start after flushing. We now examine each of these
three sources one by one.
Figure 6 shows the stall time in FLUSH just waiting for the
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Figure 5: The overall overhead of FLUSH in execution
time normalized to the execution time of BASE
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Figure 6: The stall time for flushing states in FLUSH nor-
malized to the execution time of BASE
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Figure 7: Branch mispredictions in BASE and FLUSH
microarchitectural states to be flushed, and the last column is
the average across all benchmarks. As we can see, flushing the
states takes merely 0.4% of the execution time. Benchmark
xalancbmk has the longest stall time (3.2%) because it makes
a large number of system calls (which trigger exceptions) to
print characters to stdout.
While we do not show the results here, the changes in in-
struction and data cache and TLB misses are negligible, so
they are unlikely to be the source of performance degradation.
Figure 7 shows the number of branch mispredictions per
thousand instructions in BASE and FLUSH. The last column
is the average across all benchmarks. It turns that flushing the
branch predictions has substantial impact on the misprediction
rate. On average, the mispredictions per thousand instructions
rise from 18.3 to 24.3 after microarchitecture-state flushing is
enabled. This significant increase is responsible for the 5.4%
overall performance overhead in Figure 5. For benchmark
astar, mispredictions go up from 30.1 to 46.2. This leads to the
maximum overhead of 10.9% in Figure 5.
Summary: Flushing per-core microarchitectural states on con-
text switches has little impact on the miss rates of caches or
TLBs, but it increases the branch-misprediction rate substan-
tially. However, the overall performance overhead caused by
flushing is still small.
7.2 Set-Partitioning the LLC
Methodology: For LLC partitioning, the ideal evaluation
methodology would run multiprogrammed workloads on a
multiprocessor. For example, we would like to evaluate a 16-
core multiprocessor with 16MB shared L2 cache (LLC). We
assume that each core is still using the parameters in Figure 4,
and the LLC is still 16-way set-associative and using 64B cache
lines. However, the FPGA does not have enough logic gates
and SRAMs for us to prototype such a multiprocessor. We
now explain how to closely approximate the evaluation of a
multiprocessor using a single core.
We first point out that the performance overheads of LLC
set partitioning mainly come from (1) the decreased LLC size
allocated for the enclave application, and (2) the additional
conflict misses in LLC caused by changing the cache-indexing
function as described below. In fact, the allocated LLC size is
not a concern because our system allows an enclave to claim
multiple sets of the LLC. Besides, running multiprogrammed
workloads without considering security would also require par-
titioning the LLC for Quality of Service (QoS). This evaluation
is not about how to size each LLC partition to achieve the best
QoS, so we focus on the second type of overhead, i.e., cache
misses caused by changing the indexing function of LLC.
Consider the case that we run a multiprogrammed workload,
which consists of 16 SPEC benchmarks, on the 16-core mul-
tiprocessor with one benchmark on each core. For simplicity,
we assume the insecure baseline partitions the LLC to allocate
1MB to each core. If the baseline is using way partitioning,
then each core is using effectively a 1MB direct-mapped LLC.
Here, we overestimate the baseline performance by assuming
that each core in baseline is using a 1MB cache which still
has 16 associative ways. That is, the insecure baseline perfor-
mance can be approximated by the performance of the BASE
processor. In our secure system, consider the case that we
set-partition the 16MB LLC into 64 regions, each with 256KB
and we assign 4 regions (1MB) to each enclave which runs one
SPEC benchmark on a core. In this case, there is no difference
in the allocated LLC size, and the performance overhead of set-
partitioning comes only from the change in the cache-indexing
function, which we explain next.
Consider a cache-line address A which does not contain
the 6-bit line offset (for 64B cache line). For the baseline
insecure 1MB LLC of BASE which has 210 sets, the cache
index for this line is the lower 10 bits of A, i.e., A[9 : 0]. For the
set-partitioned 16MB LLC of our conceptual multiprocessor
which has 214 sets, the cache index is the combination of the
6-bit DRAM region R and the lower 8 bits of A, i.e., {R[5 :
0],A[7 : 0]}. Since one enclave only gets 4 regions, the higher
4 bits of region R is fixed, and the effective cache index is 10
bits, i.e., {R[1 : 0],A[7 : 0]}. This is equivalent to indexing the
1MB LLC of BASE using a different index function.
As a result, to approximate the performance impact of LLC
set-partitioning, we can simply measure the influence of re-
placing the higher 2 bits of the LLC index of BASE with the
lower 2 bits of the DRAM region, i.e., the effect of changing
the LLC index from A[9 : 0] to {R[1 : 0],A[7 : 0]}. We refer to
the processor that uses the new LLC index as PART, and we
compare the performance of PART against BASE.
The DRAM region R is the higher bits of the cache-line
address. In the case of 2GB DRAM, R[1 : 0] would be A[20 :
19]. The performance overhead of PART is caused by using
higher address bits to index the LLC.
Results: Figure 8 shows the increased execution time caused
by LLC set-partitioning. The last column shows the average
across all benchmarks. Lower bars mean less performance
overheads. The average overhead in execution time is 7.4%,
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and the maximum overhead is 21.6% (in benchmark gcc).
To better understand the performance overhead, we show
the number of LLC misses per thousand instructions for BASE
and PART in Figure 9. Because of using higher address bits in
the LLC index, the average LLC misses per thousand instruc-
tions increase from 17.4 to 19.6 (the last column in the figure).
For benchmark gcc which has the maximum execution-time
overhead, its LLC misses get doubled. These increased misses
can be understood as follows. In our evaluation, we start the
benchmark right after the Linux boots. At that time, most of
the physical memory has not been allocated, and Linux tends to
allocate physical pages sequentially for the benchmark. Thus,
physical addresses in the working set of the benchmark are
likely to share the same higher bits, and thus get mapped to the
same LLC index, leading to more LLC conflict misses.
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Figure 8: Overhead of PART in execution time normalized
to the execution time of BASE
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Figure 9: LLC (L2$) misses in BASE and PART
7.3 Partitioning and Sizing LLC MSHR
Methodology: We still consider the case of a multiprocessor
as in Section 7.2. For the insecure baseline, we assume the
average memory-system bandwidth available to each core is
the same as a single-core BASE processor. That is, each core
in the multiprocessor can occupy 16 LLC MSHR entries and
have 24 in-flight DRAM requests on average.
Now consider the secure case that we partition and size the
LLC MSHRs to prevent side channels due to contention for
LLC MSHRs and DRAM bandwidth. According to Section 5.2,
the LLC MSHRs should be partitioned to allocate 12 entries
for each core, so that the memory requests (including both
writebacks and data fetches) generated by each core can never
exceed the DRAM bandwidth available to the core (i.e., 24
requests). If the LLC is organized as several cache banks, then
the partition of MSHRs should be done in each LLC bank. In
this evaluation, we consider the case that the LLC is sliced into
4 banks according to the lower bits of the cache index. In this
case, one core will be allocated with 3 entries in each bank
(still 12 entries in total). In the insecure baseline, cache misses
by a core can occupy MSHR entries in any bank, i.e., the 16
LLC MSHRs can be distributed across 4 banks in any form.
According to the above analysis, the performance overheads
of LLC-MSHR partitioning and sizing come from (1) the re-
duction in MSHR size, and (2) insufficient MSHRs in a single
cache bank (i.e., bank conflicts). To model the effects of these
two overheads, we instantiate the MISS processor based on the
BASE processor. The MISS processor has only 12 LLC-MSHR
entries compared to 16 in BASE, and the MSHRs in MISS
are sliced into 4 banks (according to the lower bits of cache-
line addresses). The performance overheads of LLC-MSHR
partitioning can be characterized by the performance differ-
ence between BASE and MISS. The performance of MISS
is a pessimistic estimate. This is because overwhelming one
MSHR bank will stall the whole MSHR structure in MISS,
while different MSHR banks are independent from each other
in the real case. This modeling error can be avoided by refining
the implementation in the future.
Results: Figure 10 shows the increased execution time caused
by partitioning the MSHRs in the LLC. Lower bars mean less
performance overheads. The average overhead in execution
time is 3.2% (the last column), and the maximum is 8.3% (in
benchmark astar). This overhead is not large.
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Figure 10: Overhead of MISS in execution time normal-
ized to the execution time of BASE
7.4 LLC Arbiter
Methodology: As described in Section 5.4.4, the performance
overheads of the round-robin arbiter associated with the LLC
cache-access pipeline are caused by bandwidth loss in case of
bursty cache traffic and the increased latency in accessing the
pipeline. We do not evaluate the overhead due to bursty traffic
because it depends strongly on the timing of the concurrently
running applications and we are unable to fit a big RiscyOO
multiprocessor on an FPGA. As an approximation, we evaluate
only the overhead caused by increased pipeline latency. For a
16-core multiprocessor, the pipeline latency is increased by 8
cycles on average (cf. Section 5.4.4). We instantiate the ARB
processor, which increases the LLC-pipeline latency in BASE
by 8 cycles, to model the overhead.
Results: Figure 11 shows the increased execution time caused
by the LLC arbiter. Lower bars mean less performance over-
heads. The average overhead in execution time is 8.5% (the last
column), and the maximum is 14% (in benchmark libquantum).
This overhead is comparable to LLC set-partitioning.
7.5 Turning off Speculation
Methodology: When a processor runs non-speculatively, the
address translation and execution of a memory instruction (e.g.,
a load or a store) cannot start until the instruction can never
be squashed (e.g., by branch mispredictions or exceptions).
Since turning off speculation is uncommon, we implement
the non-speculative mode on top of the BASE processor in a
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Figure 11: Overhead of ARB in execution time normalized
to the execution time of BASE
simple (but less optimized) way. In the non-speculative mode,
the processor does not rename a memory instruction (and thus
cannot enter it into the ROB) until the ROB is empty. We refer
to this processor as NONSPEC.
To evaluate the performance overhead of turning off spec-
ulation, we run benchmarks on NONSPEC entirely in non-
speculative mode. Since non-speculative mode is much slower
than the normal speculative mode, we truncate the benchmarks.
Each benchmark was run for 20 billion instructions without
collecting performance data, and then run for 40 billion instruc-
tions collecting performance data. Benchmarks were rerun on
BASE using this methodology to get the baseline performance.
Results: Figure 12 shows the increased execution time caused
by running in the non-speculative mode. Lower bars mean less
performance overheads. The average overhead in execution
time is 205% (the last column), and the maximum overhead
is 427% (in benchmark h264ref). Although the overhead is
large, it is incurred only at the beginning and end of an enclave
program for the common use cases of enclaves, and it does not
apply to insecure programs running outside enclaves.
bzip2 gcc mcfgobm
k
hmm
er sjeng
libqua
ntumh264
ref
omne
tpp astar
xalan
cbmkavera
ge
0
200
400
In
cr
ea
se
d 
ru
nt
im
e 
(%
)
Figure 12: Overhead of NONSPEC in execution time nor-
malized to the execution time of BASE
7.6 Overall Performance Overheads of MI6
Overheads of enclave processes: A enclave program running
on MI6 is affected by flushing microarchitectural states on
every context switch, LLC set-partitioning, LLC-MSHR parti-
tioning and sizing, and the LLC round-robin arbiter. (We omit
the influence of turning off speculation as discussed earlier.) Its
overhead can be approximated by evaluating the performance
of the F+P+M+A processor, which is simply a combination
of FLUSH, PART, MISS and ARB. Figure 13 shows increased
execution time of F+P+M+A compared to BASE, i.e., the per-
formance overhead of an enclave program. Lower bars mean
less performance overheads. The average overhead of running
in the enclave of MI6 is 16.4% (the last column in the figure),
and the maximum overhead is 34.8% (benchmark gcc).
These performance numbers are a good approximation. The
primary omission is ignoring the effect of bursty traffic on the
overhead of the LLC arbiter. However, we are conservative in
modeling the overhead of LLC-MSHR partitioning and sizing.
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Figure 13: Execution-time overhead of an enclave applica-
tion in MI6 normalized to the execution time of BASE
Overheads of non-enclave processes: Compared to the per-
formance overhead of an enclave program shown in Figure 13,
the overhead of a non-enclave program in MI6 will be less
because there is no flushing of microarchitectural states.
Area overhead: Our synthesis results show that both BASE
and F+P+M+A can be clocked at a maximum of 1GHz. There-
fore, the additional hardware for enforcing security does not af-
fect clock frequency. As for area, F+P+M+A is approximately
2% bigger than BASE. Several area-consuming components
like LLC, L1 SRAMs and FPUs are not included in the area
results, so a 2% area increase on the rest is quite small.
8. CONCLUSION
Enclaves strengthen the process abstraction to restore iso-
lation guarantees under a specified threat model. Through
careful design, prototyping and evaluation, we show how such
enclaves can be supported in MI6, an aggressive speculative
out-of-order processor prototype, with reasonable overhead.
Further design effort can lower overhead for unprotected pro-
grams by turning on strong timing independence only when
at least one enclave is running, and for unprotected and pro-
tected programs by modifying the OS to reduce the overhead
of cache-indexing. A primary remaining challenge is allowing
enclave software to be more expressive, e.g., allowing shar-
ing of memory across protection domains while maintaining
isolation.
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